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This study examines the manipulability of simple n-person bargaining problems by pre-donations where the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. We extend previous results on the manipulation of two-person 
bargaining problems to the n-person case. We show that with a pre-bargaining stage where agents are 
allowed to sign contracts that alter the bargaining set, agents with greater ideal payoffs transform the 
bargaining set into one on which KS distributes payoffs in accordance with the Concessionary Division 
Rule of disputed property. The resulting payoff distribution is efficient in that every individual is strictly 
better-off relative to the original payoff allocation. 
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1. Introduction 
Suppose that there is a property whose value can be monetarily evaluated. Many individuals have claims on 
it and each values the item differently. We face a problem, which is to allocate the available value among 
the claimants. The property may be divisible or indivisible. In the former case, we can allocate pieces of it; 
if not, one of the individuals can have it all and then monetarily compensate the others. 
  This division problem can also be analyzed as a bargaining problem, which describes possible non-
negative monetary payoff pairs for the bargainers. In a bargaining problem, there is a threat (or a 
disagreement) point that summarizes the resulting payoff to each bargainer in case of disagreement and a 
bargaining set that shows all possible payoffs that can be achieved. 
  In this paper, we examine the behavior of the n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) bargaining 
solution under sequential pre-donations. We define a pre-donation as a monetary transfer of a bargainer’s 
would-be payoffs to others before the final bargain is reached. We refer to this stage in which the bargainers 
make promises of future transfers as the pre-bargaining stage. We limit our attention to simple bargaining 
problems, where the threat point is fixed at the origin and the set of Pareto Optimal points defines a linear 
relationship among the possible payoffs. When the threat point is fixed at the origin, a bargaining problem 
can be identified via its bargaining set only. Having the Pareto set define a linear relationship among the 
potential payoffs simplifies the computation of the KS solution on the bargaining sets that result from 
manipulations via monetary transfers.  
  We show that, when bargainers with higher valuations (or ideal payoffs) are allowed to sequentially 
sign contracts to transfer shares of their future payoffs to others with lower valuations, the payoffs under KS 
applied to the altered bargaining set coincide with those of the Concessionary Division Rule. For example, 
in the two-person case where the valuation of the bargainers are 1 and  , with   1 , this division rule 
concedes his ideal payoff 1 to the bargainer with lower valuation and pays   1  to the other, unless   2 , 
in which case   is shared equally. Therefore, for   2  manipulation by agent two leads to a payoff of 1 to 
agent one and   1  to agent two, which strictly dominates the KS allocation of 1/2 to agent one and  /2 to 
agent two. Hence, pre-donations lead to an efficient outcome in which agents are strictly better-off under 
the new payoff allocation relative to the original one as long as valuations of bargainers are high enough. In 
particular, we find that in an n-person simple bargaining problem pre-donations lead to a strictly better 
outcome for all agents when               2   for   1,..,  where    is the valuation of agent i. 
  Our environment is one in which there is perfect information. The valuations of the individuals, the 
bargaining set, and the bargaining solution are all common knowledge. Therefore, given this information, 
individuals can calculate their would-be payoffs. Hence, if an individual finds it in his interest to change the 
set of possible payoffs without hurting others, he will do so by promising monetary transfers out of his 
would-be payoffs (payoffs that would materialize when KS is applied to the altered set). Our requirement of 
Pareto optimality is therefore a strong one: a payoff distribution is optimal if there exists no other 
distribution that will make at least one individual strictly better-off without making anyone worse-off. 
  This paper relates to a bigger class of problems where manipulations of equilibrium outcomes are 
analyzed. The most well-known manipulation mechanism is misrepresentation of utility functions by agents 
in an exchange economy with a competitive allocation: in order to achieve a better outcome for himself, an 
agent can behave as if his utility function is different than the true one. Hurwicz (1972) shows that any 3 
 
Pareto optimal and individually rational reallocation scheme suffers from this problem. Another well-
known mechanism is manipulation via hiding, transfer, or destruction of endowments. Some applications of 
this are Postlewaite (1979) to resource reallocation mechanisms, Sertel (1994) to Lindahl Equilibria, Sertel 
and Sanver (2002) to the men- or women-optimal matching rule, and Atlamaz and Klaus (2007) to 
exchange markets with indivisible goods. Our paper is most closely related to Sertel (1992), which 
examines the manipulability of the two-person Nash bargaining solution under pre-donations. He shows 
that the bargainer with greater valuation generally alters the bargaining set so that the resulting payoffs 
under the Nash solution, when applied to the altered set, coincide with that of the Talmudic division rule. 
Another application of this sort appears in Orbay (2003) which examines pre-donations in two-person 
bargaining problems where the threat point may be in the positive orthant, with an application to collusion 
in an asymmetric duopoly. 
  The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides definitions and presents the model. Section 3 
illustrates the behavior of the KS solution under manipulation via pre-donations in the three-person 
bargaining problem and proves that the outcome coincides with that of the Concessionary division rule. 
Section 4 extends the results to the n-person case. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Model 
Let    1,2,…,   be the set of agents. Given any integer   2 , an  -person bargaining problem is any 
ordered pair   ,   where   is a compact and convex subset of   ,      ,…,        , and there exists 
     such that         for every     . Here,   is called the bargaining set and   is called the 
disagreement or threat point. Following Sertel (1992), without loss of generality, we set   0 , the origin 
of   , so that suppressing  , a bargaining problem is determined by its bargaining set only. We regard the 
bargaining problem as simple if and only if it has a bargaining set of the form: 
    =      |      1              1 ∑
  
  
   
                ,    1      
for some      ,   ,…,         
  with 1                . 
  We can interpret this problem as a property division problem as in Sertel (1992). In this 
interpretation we assume that there is a certain item of property which can be monetarily valued. Claimants 
have different valuations on the property, so that agent  ’s valuation is    times the valuation of agent 1 
(normalized to one in our problem). The division problem distributes   , the highest claimed value, among 
the claimants.
1 If the property is divisible, we can we can distribute shares of it among our agents. If not, we 
can give it to one of them and require her to monetarily compensate the others. 
Definition 1. An  -person division rule is any function   which assigns to each simple bargaining problem 
   a point                ,      ,…,        in   
  such that for each      and       1 ,∞ ,        
 0,    and ∑           
 
    . 
                                                            
1 A good example of this would be an abstract painting that is inherited by two distant cousins, one living in a modern 
city and the other in a rural area. The item would be much more valuable to the former, as she has the opportunity to 
either sell it at a high price to someone else in her community or enjoy the painting in her beautifully decorated home. 4 
 
  In this context where bargainer’s valuations are ranked as in a simple bargaining problem, a 
division rule will be called Concessionary if it obeys the following rules: 
•  Starting from the first agent, each agent   1  concedes his ideal payoff to agent   if, for each  , 
agent    1 ’s payoff is no less than agent  ’s payoff. 
•  Whenever agent   1 ’s payoff is less than agent  ’s payoff for some  , the property is redistributed 
as follows: the agents with lower valuations are conceded the maximum payoff they can achieve 
such that each agent’s payoff is no more than his ideal and, for each  , agent   1  receives a payoff 
that is no less than agent  ’s. 
We will denote the Concessionary division rule by  . Note that when agent   1 ’s valuation is high 
enough relative agent  ’s, the Concessionary rule will divide the property such that each agent gets his 
ideal payoff, that is, for each  ,                   whenever             1      . 
Definition 2. Given a bargaining problem   ,  , a point      is Pareto Optimal if and only if      
for all      with     .
2 Given any set      , we define its Pareto frontier      as: 
                    ′        ′ . 
Definition 3. Given a bargaining problem   ,   and a point      , we say that   is individually 
rational if and only if     . 
Definition 4. Let   denote the set of all bargaining problems. A bargaining solution is a function 
 :      such that for every   ,      ,    ,      . 
 Given  an  n-person bargaining problem   ,  , let      denote the ideal payoff of  , i.e., the maximal 
payoff       m a x    ,      .The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the function KS that chooses the unique 
Pareto optimal point        ,…,     in   such that: 
 
     
       
 
         
           
  for all   1 , 2 ,…,  1 . 
Figure 1 shows the two-person simple bargaining set, its Pareto frontier (shown in bold) and KS. 
The bargaining set is a triangle and the set of Pareto optimal points is a line. Notice that the solution is 
on the Pareto frontier and each agent receives one half of his ideal payoff. 
Definition 5. Given a bargaining problem   ,   with   fixed at the origin, a pre-donation from agent   
to   is any function Λ :       , parameterized by some   ,     0,1 , which transforms each    ,     
   into Λ    ,       1     ,    ,        ,    .  
Given any    and pre-donation Λ , we write: 
Λ           ′      
  
′    1    ,     ,   
′          ,               ,          
  
′                        ,  
  
                                                            











Figure 1: The two-person simple bargaining set, its Pareto frontier and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 
 
to denote the bargaining set after agent  's manipulation. Hence, a pre-donation from individual   to   simply 
augments payoffs of the latter by transferring him a share   ,  of the former’s payoff. 
  In the next section we show the manipulability of a three-person simple bargaining problem. This 
will fix the ideas for the n-person case. 
3. A Three-person Bargaining Problem 
Consider a three-person simple bargaining problem where the bargaining set is: 
             
      1 ,          1      ,          1      
  
  
   
with 1         . This set is a tetrahedron with the disagreement point fixed at the origin, as shown in 
Figure 2. The Pareto frontier of    is the closed convex hull            1,0,0 , 0,  ,0 , 0,0,    . On 
this set, KS picks the point           13 ⁄ ,    3 ⁄ ,    3 ⁄  . 
We now show that KS is manipulable via pre-donations. We assume that donations occur 
sequentially, that is, agents are given a chance to transfer a portion of their would-be payoffs in the order 
that their valuations are ranked. Therefore, at the first stage of our setting, agent two offers a gift to agent 
one, and in the next stage agent three makes his offer to agents two and one simultaneously. In Proposition 
1 we show that an agent has no incentive to pre-donate to another whose ideal payoff is higher than his 
own. Therefore, agent one will never offer a transfer to agents two or three, and agent two will never find it 






















Figure 2: The three-person simple bargaining set and its KS solution 
 
  Let agent two pre-donate a share   ,  out of his future payoffs to agent one. We denote the 
bargaining set after his donation as Λ     . Figure 3 illustrates this set. Its Pareto frontier is: 
    Λ        
   1,0,0 ,      , ,    1     ,  ,0 , 0,0,             ,   1
       , ,    1     ,  ,0 , 0,0,                                 .
 
Given the Pareto set, we check that the KS solution is: 
     Λ        
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,
     ,    
      , 
,
  
      , 
         ,   1
 
    , 
  ,
     ,    
  ,
  
                              .
  
It is clear that when     ,   1 , the payoff of the donor (agent two) is increasing in   ,  if and only if 
    3 . So, we set   ,  as high as possible, which approaches 
 
  
. Similarly, when     ,   1 , his payoff is 
decreasing in   , ; so we choose   ,  as small as possible. Therefore, the donor's payoff under KS is 
























Figure 3: The three person bargaining set manipulated by bargainer two (shown for     ,   1 ) 
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For     3 , the optimal donation shares turn the base of the tetrahedron into a rectangle where two's ideal 
payoff is now     1 . Denoting the bargaining set after two's optimal donation by Λ 
     , the payoffs to 
agents are: 
   Λ 
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Notice that agent two achieves a higher payoff by manipulating (for, 
      
   
  
   when     3 ). 
  In the second stage of our setting, the bargainer who has the highest utility per share of the item, 
agent three, is allowed to offer gifts to agents one and two simultaneously. We do not allow for a pre-
  
   
   1    ,   
   
1 0      , 
   8 
 
donation in which agent three offers a gift to one of the bargainers and then to the other. We further assume 
that gift offers should be proportional to the agents ideal payoffs on the relevant bargaining set, that is, we 
require   ,      ,      1   . These two assumptions guarantee that the Pareto optimal points lie on a plane; 
which enables us to calculate the payoffs in a straightforward way.
3 Given Λ 
      and any pre-donation 
shares   ,  and   , , the bargaining set after agent three's manipulation (illustrated in Figure 4) is: 
Λ  Λ 
                ,   ,        ,   , 1    ,      ,         ,   ,       Λ 
      . 
In this case, it can easily be verified that the Pareto set and the KS solution on Λ  Λ 
       are (using 
  ,      ,      1    ): 
  Λ  Λ 
           
        , ,       , ,     1     ,      ,   , 1,    1 ,0             ,   1  
     , ,       , ,     1     ,      ,                                                        ,
 
   Λ  Λ 
           
 
1
2      , 
,
     1  
2      , 
,
 1       ,    
2      , 
           ,   1  
     , ,     ,      1  ,    1       ,                   .
 
Note that agent three's payoff is decreasing in   ,  whenever     ,   1 ; hence we set   ,  as low as 
possible, that is,   , 
   
 
  
. In the other case, his payoff is increasing in   ,  if and only if     2     (for, the 
derivative of 
       ,    
      , 
 with respect to   ,  has the sign of     2    ); so we choose   ,  as high as 
possible and set   , 
   
 
  
. Thus, whenever     ,   1   ,   agent three's payoff is maximized at: 
   , 
  ,   , 
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The resulting the payoffs are: 
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3Note that offers are public information here. Therefore, this assumption might also be justified by the fact that any 
other offer would result in one of the bargainers leaving the table, as that would not obey the spirit of the KS where 














Figure 4: The bargaining set after agent three's donations. 
 
 Thus,  when      2    , pre-donation results in payoffs that coincide with those of the 
Concessionary division rule applied to the original set   . Note that no agent has an incentive to move away 
from the final allocation as each receives a payoff which is larger than his payoff had the KS solution been 
applied to the original bargaining set. 
  There is a natural question to ask here: what would happen if the sequence in which donations are 
made would change? That is, what if agent three was the first to make donations to the others, followed by 
agent two? In the Appendix we show that the final allocation would be  1,    1 ,          1  . In that 
case both agent three's payoff (         1 ) and the total value allocated (    1 ) would be lower 
compared to those in our original order of pre-donations (where agent three gets         and the total 
allocated value is   ); however, the payoffs after manipulation would still dominate the non-manipulated 
ones. 
4. Extension to the n-person Case 
In this section we generalize our result to the n-person simple bargaining problem. In our setting there are n 
bargainers whose valuations on some divisible disputed property differ. We denote the value of the property 
for the     bargainer by    (    ) with 1                . In the pre-bargaining stage agents are 
allowed, sequentially, to give shares out of their future payoffs to their opponents, starting with the second 
bargainer. After the     bargainer completes his turn, the KS solution determines the payoffs to all. As in 
  
   
    1  
   1     ,      ,   
1 0      , 
    ,  
   10 
 
the previous section, Λ  .  denotes the bargaining set after agent i donates shares    ,  
   
 
 of his ideal 
payoff to his opponents and Λ 
  .  denotes the resulting set when the optimal pre-donations   , 
   are applied 
to the problem. 
Lemma: Let    1,2,…,   be the set of agents and    be an n-person simple bargaining set. The first 
bargainer (the bargainer with the lowest ideal payoff) has no incentive to pre-donate to any other bargainer. 
Proof. Take a simple bargaining set    and any bargainer   such that     1 . Assume that agent one 
manipulates the bargaining set via a pre-donation to  . Let          ,…,      denote a generic point in   . 
After agent one's manipulation, the Pareto set will be the closed convex hull of n different points in   : 
    ,   ,…,     
where        
1    ,          1
       ,           
0                    ,
  
and for   2 ,…,  ,                    
0          .
 
KS picks the unique optimal point      ,   ,…,     with 
  








  Solving this system, we find that the KS payoff for the pre-donor is: 
    
   1     ,  
        , 
. 
Maximizing    with respect to   , , it is apparent that     is increasing in   ,  if and only if      1 , which 
contradicts our assumption that     1 . Hence, agent one has no incentive to give a share out of his future 
payoffs to any other agent. 
               
Corollary. No bargainer prefers to pre-donate another whose ideal payoff is larger than him. 
Theorem 1. Let    1,2,…,   be the set of agents and    an n-person simple bargaining set. Assume that 
agents are allowed to pre-donate sequentially, obeying the ascending order of their ideal payoffs. If pre-
donations are proportional to the agents' maximum possible payoffs at each stage of the manipulation, then 
the payoff distribution under the manipulated KS solution coincides with that of the Concessionary division 
rule whenever               2   for      . 
Proof. We show, by induction on m, that the optimal behavior of any agent  ,   1 , is to choose the 
shares to be donated to other agents such that   , 
   
       
  
 for   1,2,..,  1.  
  We start with agent two. He pre-donates a share   ,  to agent one. When     ,   1 , the Pareto 
frontier is the closed convex hull     ,   ,…,    , where: 11 
 
       
    ,                    1
   1     ,           2
0                             ,
 
and for      2 ,                      
 0             .
 
 Whenever      ,   1 , the optimal set is the hull of n-1 points in the n-dimensional space such that: 
       
    ,                    1
   1     ,           2
0                             ,
 
and for      1,2 ,                    
0          .
 
  The KS solution picks the unique point      ,   ,…,     on the Pareto frontier with: 
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  when     ,   1  and 
  
    , 
 
  
       ,  
   
  
  
 otherwise. Thus, the payoffs 
assigned to the bargainers are: 
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In the case     ,   1 , agent two's payoff is increasing in his donation if and only if       ; so   , 
        
 
  
 gives the highest payoff to him as long as       . When     ,   1 , agent two's payoff is decreasing in 
his donation; so we set as low as possible, i.e,   , 
        
 
  
. With these optimal shares to be promised, the 
payoff distribution is: 
   Λ 










It is important to note here that if       , our bargainer is indifferent between manipulating or not, whereas 
if       , he will not manipulate. 
  Now, assume that the optimal pre-donation shares for agent  ,   2 , are   , 
   
       
  
 for 
k 1,2,..,  1. We will show that the optimal behavior of agent   1  is to choose the shares to be 
donated according to our claim. 
 Assume  pre-donations       ,  
   
 
. As before, we impose     ,                     ,  for 
  1 , 2 ,…,  , that is, the shares to be donated must be proportional to the receivers' maximum possible 
payoffs. As shares are proportional, we can reduce the problem into a much simpler one in which the Pareto 
set can be defined depending on the size of the promise that bargainer one receives. There are two cases. 12 
 
First, we analyze the case when         ,   1 .  The Pareto frontier of the manipulated bargaining set will 
be a closed convex hull of n     1 points in the n-dimensional space. In particular, those points are: 
      
                   
0                       ,
                                          
       
        ,                  
     1        , 
 
   
 
0                              ,
             1 
and for     3,4,…,        1,                           1  
0                                    .
 
The KS picks the optimal point      ,   ,…,     such that 
  
       
 
    
       ∑     , 
 
       
  
  
  for 
    1,2,…,  and     2 ,…,  . The solution of the system yields the following payoffs by KS: 
    
 
   
 
   
 
         
    1          , 
                1,…, 
     1   ∑     , 
 
     
    1          , 
                     1
  
    1          , 
                       .
 
It is straightforward to verify that the payoff of agent   1  is increasing in     ,  if and only if       
       1  , in which case we set     , 
        
 
  
 . Plugging this back in the KS solution, we get: 
   Λ   
   .    
1
   
,
    1
   
,…,
         
   
,…,
  
   
 . 
We note that whenever               1  , agent   1  will be indifferent between making a pre-
donation or not, and when               1  , he will choose not to manipulate. 
  In the remaining case when         ,   1 , we verify that KS payoffs are: 






        , 
   
                                                 1,…, 
     1   ∑     , 
 
     
   
                               1
  
   
                                                                   .
 
The payoff of agent   1  is decreasing in     , ; hence we set     , 
        
 
  
 . Therefore, the KS 
payoffs, again, are: 
   Λ   
   .    
1
   
,
    1
   
,…,
         
   
,…,
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Letting     1 , we see that  
   Λ 
        1,    1 ,        ,…,           .  
               
  Next, we demonstrate a rather strong result. When all the pre-donations are done, one might wonder 
if any of the agents would deviate from the final KS payoff allocation by making a pre-donation to any 
other agent. In other words, we might ask whether the final payoff allocation in Theorem 1 is stable. We 
find that no other cycle of pre-donations would make our agents better-off; hence no agent has an incentive 
to deviate from the final allocation. Note that agents with higher valuations have already given their optimal 
shares to those with lower valuations. 
Theorem 2. For any simple bargaining problem    and any pre-donation   ,     0,1  where   and   are two 
bargainers such that     Λ 
             Λ 
      , we have      Λ       Λ 
                Λ 
      , 
that is, no agent wants to deviate from the final payoff allocation    Λ 
      . 
Proof. Take any two bargainers   and   such that     Λ 
             Λ 
      . Assume that agent   wants 
to make a reverse donation   ,     0 , 1    to agent  . Then, the unique Pareto optimal point in the new set 
Λ       Λ 
        will be    ,   ,…,     such that: 
      
             1     ,                            
                            ,           
                                                       .
 
KS will choose this point as it obeys optimality. But, for any   ,   0 , the     coordinate of the solution 
             1     ,   is lower than                    Λ 
      . Thus, agent   would pick   ,   0 . 
                                       
  Theorem 1 establishes that any bargainer   has incentive to manipulate the bargaining set when 
              2  . Thus, although at the early stages of pre-donation (with   low) higher ideal payoffs 
are necessary for the bargainers to have an incentive to manipulate the problem, this requirement becomes 
softer as we proceed to later stages. Another observation is that the bargainers do not immediately attain 
their total concessions. As an example, consider agent one. Without any manipulation, his payoff under KS 
would be 1/ . After agent two's donation, his payoff rises to 1/     1 . Agent three's manipulation 
increases his payoff to 1/     2  and finally agent n's gift makes him reach his ideal concession 
 
         
1. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we discussed the manipulability of the many-person KS bargaining solution via pre-donations. 
We considered simple bargaining problems with monetary payoffs and the disagreement points at the 
origin. When bargainers sequentially pre-donate (in increasing order of ideal payoffs), the resulting payoff 14 
 
distribution under the KS solution is Concessionary. Thus, under the manipulated solution, the bargainer 
with the highest ideal payoff takes the whole cake and then monetarily compensates others. We would like 
to emphasize that manipulation leads to an efficient outcome, where every agent is strictly better-off 
relative to the original solution. 
  A transfer of a share of future payoffs is a natural means by which bargainers can alter the 
allocation of the available value when the solution concept and the bargaining set are public knowledge. As 
noted by Sertel (1992), no legal obstacle under commercial law can stop the agents from signing contracts 
under which everybody will be better-off. Thus, "farsighted" individuals might generally manipulate many 
of the well-known axiomatic bargaining solutions, such as the Nash, Maschler-Perles, Egalitarian, and the 




Consider the three-person simple bargaining set. Suppose we change the order in which manipulations are 
made. In particular, agent three goes first and when he is done, agent two follows. We again assume that 
pre-donations are proportional to the agents' maximum possible payoffs.  
  Let agent three offer gifts   ,  and   ,  to agents one and two simultaneously, where   ,        ,  
by assumption. Given   , the bargaining set after agent three's manipulation (illustrated in Figure 5) is: 
Λ                 ,   ,        ,   , 1    ,      ,         ,   ,           . 
To save space, we only analyze the case when     ,   1 . Using   ,        , , the Pareto set and the KS 
solution on Λ      are: 
  Λ          1,0,0 , 0,  ,0 ,      , ,0,    1    1       ,   , 0,      , ,    1    1       ,     
   Λ        
1
3      , 
,
  
3      , 
,
 1    1   2   ,    
3      , 
 . 
Agent three's payoff is increasing in   ,  whenever     3  1   2 ; hence we set   ,  as high as possible 
and set   , 
   
 
  
. Hence, the KS allocation under this optimal pre-donation is: 
   Λ 




























  Next, it is agent two's turn to pre-donate a share   ,  out of his future payoffs to agent one. Figure 6 
illustrates the new set. Again, we only illustrate the case when     ,   1 . The Pareto frontier is: 
  Λ  Λ 
             1,0,0 ,      , ,    1     ,  ,0 ,     , ,    1     ,  ,          1   ,
 1,0,         1   . 
The KS solution requires     
  
       ,    
  
        . Therefore, the payoffs are: 
     Λ  Λ 
           
 
      , 
,
     ,    
      , 
,
        
      , 












Figure 6: The bargaining set after agent two's manipulation. 
  Agent two's payoff is increasing in   ,  if     2 ; hence we set   , 





   Λ 
  Λ 
           1,  ,           1  . 
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1 0    
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